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I. INTRODUCTION TO DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN HEARING LOSS CASES AT THE
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS
In mid-August 2015, five days apart, two different judges in the United
States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (the Veterans Court) decided
1
identical disability claims from two different veterans. Each veteran argued that
the Board of Veterans’ Affairs (Board) had erred in failing to refer their
2
3
respective hearing loss cases for extraschedular consideration. The Department
of Veterans Affairs (VA) previously assigned both veterans noncompensable
4
ratings for their hearing loss cases. Both veterans argued that the Board supplied
1. See Kennison v. McDonald, No. 14-3729, 2015 WL 4879201, at *1 (Vet. App. Aug. 17, 2015)
(deciding a veteran’s entitlement for disability benefits for bilateral hearing loss); McSparrin v. McDonald, No.
14-2417, 2015 WL 4756508, at *1 (Vet. App. Aug. 12, 2015) (deciding a veteran’s entitlement for disability
benefits for bilateral hearing loss).
2. Due to the confusing language commonly used in Veterans Law, whenever possible, this Comment
uses the term “hearing loss cases” when describing the relevant disability claims that arrive at the Veterans
Court.
3. Kennison, 2015 WL 4879201, at *1; McSparrin, 2015 WL 4756508, at *2; see Part II.B.2 (defining
extraschedular consideration in Veterans Law as the awarding of benefits beyond what the veteran is initially
entitled to, in a process controlled by a three-element test administered by the VA).
4. Brief of Appellant at 1–2, Kennison, 2015 WL 4879201 (Vet. App. Aug. 17, 2015) (No. 14-3729);
Brief of Appellant at 1–2, McSparrin, 2015 WL 4756508 (Vet. App. Aug. 12, 2015) (No. 14-2417); see infra
Part II.A (defining a noncompensable claim in Veterans Law that satisfies the VA’s criteria for disability but
results in no monetary compensation).
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5

inadequate reasons for the Board’s decisions. Both Board findings used the
6
“clearly erroneous” standard. And both veterans even had representation by
7
attorneys from the same law firm.
8
However, the outcomes of the two cases could not have been more different.
In McSparrin v. McDonald, Chief Judge Lawrence B. Hagel affirmed the
Board’s reasoning to deny referral for extraschedular consideration for Mr.
9
McSparrin. In Kennison v. McDonald, Judge Coral W. Pietsch vacated the
Board’s decision to deny referral for extraschedular consideration for its failure
10
to provide adequate reasons or bases for its decision to Mr. Kennison.
Inconsistent rulings on identical cases at the Veterans Court undermine one of the
11
core principles of law: precedent. Accordingly, disparate outcomes occur
because of the Court’s unique procedural rules and the lack of controlling
12
precedent for disability cases. The primary difference between identical cases is
13
the Veterans Court judge presiding over the case.
Commentators have begun to notice this problem of disparate outcomes at
the Veterans Court, sometimes even referring to it as “churn” or “the hamster
14
wheel.” This Comment presents a case study of identical hearing loss cases to

5. See Brief of Appellant at 1-2, Kennison, 2015 WL 4879201 (No. 14-3729) (stating plainly that the
claim was assigned as noncompensable); Brief of Appellant at 3–4, McSparrin, 2015 WL 4756508 (No. 142417) (“Mr. McSparrin was not entitled to compensation for his bilateral hearing loss.”).
6. Brief of Appellant at 1–2, Kennison, 2015 WL 4879201 (Vet. App. Aug. 17, 2015) (No. 14-3729);
Brief of Appellant at 1–2, McSparrin, 2015 WL 4756508 (Vet. App. Aug. 12, 2015) (No. 14-2417); see infra
Part II.A (defining a noncompensable claim in Veterans Law that satisfies the VA’s criteria for disability but
results in no monetary compensation).
7. Brief of Appellant at 9, Kennison, 2015 WL 4879201 (stating Counsel for Appellant was Michael S.
Just of Chisholm, Chisholm, and Kilpatrick in Providence, RI); Brief of Appellant at 11, McSparrin, 2015 WL
4756508 (stating Counsel for Appellant was Judy J. Donegan of Chisholm, Chisholm, and Kilpatrick in
Providence, RI).
8. See infra Part III.A.1–2 (explaining that McSparrin and Kennison had opposite outcomes at the
Veterans Court).
9. McSparrin, 2015 WL 4756508, at *7.
10. Kennison, 2015 WL 4879201, at *5 (holding that remand to the Board for further development is the
appropriate solution in this case).
11. Precedent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/precedent
(last visited on Apr. 1, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (providing the definition
of precedent—something done or said that may serve as an example or rule to authorize or justify a subsequent
act of the same or an analogous kind).
12. Infra Part III.3; see James D. Ridgway, Barton F. Stichman & Rory E. Riley, “Not Reasonably
Debatable”: The Problems with Single-Judge Decisions by the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 27 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 28–30 (Aug. 2015) [hereinafter Ridgway] (describing the instances in case law that
demonstrates disparate outcomes at the Veterans Court in mental health cases).
13. See infra Part III.A.1–2 (discussing underlying facts of Kennison and of McSparrin case). Compare
Kennison, 2015 WL 4879201 at *4 (holding issued by Judge Coral W. Pietsch), with McSparrin, 2015 WL
4756508, at *3 (holding issued by Chief Judge Lawrence B. Hagel) (demonstrating different judges and
different results).
14. Ridgway, supra note 12, at 31–33 (arguing the Board’s failure to provide adequate reasons or bases is
the most common type of error for which the Veterans Court will vacate and remand a decision, leading to
inconsistent decisions); see Alan Zarembo, VA Is Buried In A Backlog Of Never-Ending Veterans Disability
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15

demonstrate the broader problem of disparate outcomes at the Veterans Court.
The problem of disparate outcomes at the Veterans Court is of general concern to
other commentators, who have described disparate outcomes in mental health
16
and hearing loss cases.
Prior to the modification of the Court’s procedural rules, U.S. Vet. App. Rule
30(a)—the rule that primarily governs the precedential value of these cases—
17
stated that these cases generally had no precedential value. It is beyond dispute
that the Veterans Court became aware of the problem of disparate outcomes in
18
certain cases because of the modification of the procedural rules. In the summer
of 2015, the Court proposed a modification of its rules that would allow veterans
19
to cite Rule 30(a) on cases only for “the persuasive value of their logic and
20
reasoning,” while maintaining the non-precedential approach. The Court
21
adopted the revised Rule 30(a) on November 19, 2015.

Appeals, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2015), [hereinafter Zarembo] http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-veteransappeals-backlog-20151123-story.html (last visited on December 29th, 2015) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (“Cases often remain in the system for years in a slow-motion volley between the appeals
board and the regional offices, with occasional detours to federal court.”).
15. See infra Part III (discussing the nature of disparate outcomes of hearing loss cases compared to the
general outcomes of cases at the Veterans Court).
16. See generally Ridgway, supra note 12, at 28–33 (examining the problem of disparate outcomes in the
context of mental health and hearing loss cases).
17. U.S. VET. APP. R. 30(a).
A party, intervenor, or amicus curiae may not cite as precedent any action designated as
nonprecedential by the Court or any other court, or that was withdrawn after having been published
in a reporter, except when the cited action has binding or preclusive effect in the case on appeal
(such as via the application of the law-of-the-case doctrine). A copy of any unpublished action
referred to shall be attached to the document containing the reference.
Id. (stating the rule in effect as of 2011).
18. See U.S COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, MISC. ORDER NO. 07-15, IN RE: RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (July 28, 2015), https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/MiscOrder07-15.pdf
(last visited Jan. 4, 2016) [hereinafter July 2015 Veterans Court Order] (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (“[T]he Court has determined the need to revise Rule 30(a) of its Rules of Practice and
Procedure regarding citation to non-precedential authority” and seeks public comment).
19. U.S. VET. APP. R. 30(a).
A party, intervenor, or amicus curiae may not cite as precedent any action designated as
nonprecedential by the Court or any other court, or that was withdrawn after having been published
in a reporter, except when the cited action has binding or preclusive effect in the case on appeal
(such as via the application of the law-of-the-case doctrine). Actions designated as nonprecedential
by this Court or any other court may be cited only for the persuasive value of their logic and
reasoning, provided that the party states that no clear precedent exists on point and the party
includes a discussion of the reasoning as applied to the instant case. With the exception of decisions
of this Court available electronically, a copy of any unpublished action referred to shall be attached
to the document containing the reference.
Id. (emphasis added).
20. Id.
21. U.S COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, MISC. ORDER NO. 16-15, IN RE: RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (Nov. 2015), https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/MiscOrder15-16.pdf (last
visited on Jan. 4, 2016) [hereinafter November 2015 Veterans Court Order] (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
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However, this change of procedure does not go far enough to fix the problem
of disparate outcomes for the cases decided under the old procedural rule and for
22
future cases yet to occur. Currently, veterans’ cases under the new Rule 30(a)
can draw upon the reasoning with disparate outcomes, as there is still a lack of
23
controlling precedent. In essence, justice has become a lottery at the Veterans
24
Court, with outcomes wholly dependent on which judge decides the case.
To fix the problem of disparate outcomes, the Veterans Court needs to do
25
two things. First, the Court needs to further modify its procedural rules by
applying the relevant factors to create a mandatory procedural framework to
ensure precedential decisions so that this problem of disparate outcomes will not
26
occur again. Second, the Court needs to issue an en banc decision that
establishes the authority of the reasoning used in cases like McSparrin as the
27
standard for hearing loss cases going forward. Now is the time to bring attention
28
to this problem of disparate outcomes.
Part II of this Comment does the following: (1) provides necessary
background on Veterans’ Law, including an explanation of disability claims and
extraschedular consideration; (2) examines the Court’s background and unique
procedural rules that allowed disparate outcomes to occur; and (3) analyzes the
29
“clearly erroneous” standard. Part III analyzes McSparrin and Kennison,
30
compares them to other Veterans Court cases over the past six years, and also
addresses the Court’s effort to address its problem of disparate outcomes due to a
31
recent alteration of its procedural rules. Finally, Part IV argues for specific

22. Compare Kennison, 2015 WL 4879201, at *1–2 (Vet. App. Aug. 17, 2015), with McSparrin, 2015
WL 4756508, at *1–3 (Vet. App. Aug. 12, 2015) (demonstrating that two cases involving the similar facts and
law resulting in two different results); see also infra Part III.B.1–2 (explaining that the disparity of results in
hearing loss disability claims is in stark contrast with the average results for all claims at the Veterans Court).
23. The revised Rule 30(a) has not stopped disparate outcomes at the Veterans Court. Compare Payne v.
McDonald, No. 15-0228, 2016 WL 193496, at *3 (Vet. App. Jan. 15, 2016) (affirming, without precedential
value, that the Board’s decision provided an adequate rationale to not refer the veteran’s claim for
extraschedular consideration), with Graham v. McDonald, No. 15-0084, 2015 WL 9488190, at *6 (Vet. App.
Dec. 30, 2015) (vacating and remanding, without precedential value, the Board’s decision because it failed to
provide adequate reasons or bases).
24. Compare Payne, 2016 WL 193496 (holding issued by Judge Alan G. Lance), with Graham, 2015 WL
9488190 (holding issued by Judge Mary J. Schoelen) (demonstrating again that different judges led to different
results at the Veterans Court).
25. See infra Part IV (outlining the details of two recommendations of this article).
26. See infra Part IV.A (discussing recommendation to alter Rule 30(a)).
27. See infra Part IV.B (recommending the court issue a full court decision adopting the rational of
McSparrin v. McDonald).
28. Another reason for the urgency of this issue is that the Court seeks someone to write about its own
history. See Request for Proposals, THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://www.
supremecourthistory.org/uscavc/index.html (last accessed on Jan. 6, 2016) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
29. Infra Part II.A–D.
30. Infra Part III.A–B.
31. Infra Part III.C.
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procedural alterations of the Veterans Court’s rules and for issuing a full court
precedential decision, similar to McSparrin, to resolve the controversy
surrounding referral for extraschedular consideration in hearing loss disability
32
cases.
II. BACKGROUND OF VETERANS LAW AND THE COURT PROCEDURES THAT HAVE
LED TO DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN HEARING LOSS CASES AT THE VETERANS
COURT
The history of Veterans Law sheds light on why single-judge decisions result
33
in disparate outcomes in hearing loss cases at the Veterans Court. This Section
includes: (1) an explanation of the elements of a claim in Veterans Law and the
elements of a hearing loss case; (2) the governing law for referrals of
extraschedular consideration; (3) an overview of the Veterans Court, including its
judicial review and procedural rules; and (4) an explanation of the “clearly
34
erroneous” standard.
A. The General Requirements for Hearing Loss Cases at the Veterans Court.
The general requirement for the VA to pay any disability claim of benefits is
that the disability must occur or be aggravated during active military, naval, or
35
air service. The service must also discharge or release the veteran under
36
conditions other than a dishonorable discharge.
Today, there are five elements to a veteran’s application for benefits: “[1]
status as a veteran, [2] the existence of a disability, [3] the connection between
the veteran’s service and the disability, [4] the degree of disability, and [5] the
37
effective date of the disability.” The veteran’s claim is “service-connected” if all
38
five elements are present.

32. Infra Part IV.A–B.
33. See infra Part II (providing background of Veterans Law and Veterans Court procedure).
34. Infra Part II.A–D.
35. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131 (West 2015); 38 C.F.R. § 3.4(b)(1) (2015).
36. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.12, 3.301 (2015); see 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (West 2015)
(defining “veteran” for establishing veteran benefits as a service member “who was discharged or released
under conditions other than dishonorable”).
37. Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473, 484 (2006) (quoting Collaro v. West, 136 F.3d 1304, 1308
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
38. Id. at 484–85. The common practice of calling a claim “service-connected” is repetitive and
confusing, as one of the elements required for a claim is the requirement of service connection. As previously
stated, for reasons of clarity, this Comment bypasses the confusion of the requisite language and uses the
equivalent terms of “claim of disability benefits” and “disability claims” in reference to hearing loss cases.
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The VA has a general statutory duty to assist veterans in the administration
39
of their claims to the VA ; as such, the posture of the VA in the claims process is
40
non-adversarial. Congress requires that the VA assist a veteran by both
notifying the veteran of the information necessary to prove his claim and by
helping the veteran obtain the evidence and information to substantiate his
41
claim. Moreover, the VA’s duty to assist also includes a duty to make
reasonable efforts to assist a veteran in obtaining evidence necessary to
42
substantiate his claim.
The legal test the Veterans Court uses to determine hearing loss cases is
43
fundamentally straightforward. Any VA medical examination must be thorough
enough so that the evaluation of the veteran’s filed disability claim will be a fully
44
informed one. Accordingly, pursuant to VA regulations, any medical
examination must also “include a full description of the effects of the disability
45
upon the person’s ordinary activity.”
The VA assigns disability ratings for hearing loss cases through a
“mechanical application of the [disability] rating schedule” to the results of the
46
required audiometric evaluations. The VA designed the test to give ratings on a
range of zero to 100, with a zero rating resulting in the veteran’s hearing loss
47
being non-compensable, even if the veteran claims that he cannot hear. The
audiometric exam rates each ear separately and accordingly awards a financial

39. See Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (Nov. 9, 2000)
(reaffirming and clarifying “the duty of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to assist claimants for benefits. . . . “
Codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.).
40. See id. (stating that the Secretary of Veteran Affairs should provide any assistance to the veteran in
gathering evidence and provide the veteran with the “benefit of the doubt” when evaluating the evidence).
41. 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) (West 2015).
42. 38 U.S.C. § 5103(b) (West 2015); Dingess, 19 Vet. App. at 484; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) (2015); see also
Sizemore v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 264, 273–74 (2004) (recognizing that the Secretary of Veteran Affairs has a
duty to assist veterans).
43. See Lendenmann v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 345, 349 (1992) (“Assignment of disability rating for
hearing impairment are derived by a mechanical application of the rating schedule. . . . “) (emphasis added).
44. Green v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 121, 124 (1991).
45. Martinak v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 447, 454 (2007).
46. See Lendenmann, 3 Vet. App. at 349 (stating the requirements as to referral for extraschedular
consideration); see also Martinak, 21 Vet. App. at 454 (stating the Board must include the hearing loss’s effect
on the veteran’s ordinary activity). See also 38 C.F.R. § 4.85 (2015) (stating that examinations for hearing
impairment must be conducted by a state-licensed audiologist and must include a controlled speech
discrimination test and a puretone audiometry test); 38 C.F.R. § 4.86 (2015) (stating that the test results for each
ear must meet a decibel threshold, and the results of examinations will be compared to predefined Hertz levels
to determine whether a claim for benefits should be awarded, with the worst result controlling the award).
47. See Thun v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 111, 115 (2008) (“Under the approach prescribed by VA, if the
criteria reasonably describe the claimant’s disability level and symptomatology, then the claimant’s disability
picture is contemplated by the rating schedule, the assigned schedular evaluation is, therefore, adequate, and no
referral is required.”); Cromley v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 376, 378 (1995) (“The [VA] regulations are clear. Under
the schedule of ratings, level I and level II hearing are noncompensable [and thus require no payment of
benefits].”) (citation omitted).
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48

award. However, the VA has a duty to analyze the filed hearing loss claim for
49
referral for extraschedular consideration.
B. Explaining Extraschedular Consideration in Veterans Law.
Understanding extraschedular consideration requires knowing both the
underlying law and regulations governing the general rules of referral for
extraschedular consideration, as well as the specific differences of these rules as
50
to hearing loss cases in the current controversy.
1. The VA’s General Regulation about Extraschedular Consideration.
51

The VA’s regulations arise from Congressional statutory authority, which
determines the Schedule for Rating Disabilities used in evaluating the degree of
52
disability in veterans’ claims for disability compensation. As previously
discussed, the VA has a duty to examine the merits of referral for extraschedular
53
consideration, regardless if the veteran seeks the status.
Referral for extraschedular consideration is for exceptional cases of
54
disability. Under 38 C.F.R. 3.321(b), the VA has a duty to examine whether
referral for extraschedular consideration is justified in every claim, regardless of
whether the veteran seeks the status:
[T]o afford justice . . . to the exceptional case where the scheduler
evaluations are found to be inadequate, the Under Secretary for Benefits
[of the VA] or the Director, Compensation and Pension Service . . . is
authorized to approve on the basis of the criteria set forth in this
paragraph, an extra-schedular evaluation commensurate with the average
earning capacity impairment due exclusively to the service-connected
55
disability or disabilities.
Therefore, under certain conditions, the VA has the discretion to award
56
benefits that exceed what a veteran is normally entitled to in his disability claim.

48. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.86 (stating that each ear will be rated separately in the context of determining
disability for benefits).
49. See infra Part II.B (defining the process that governing awarding additional monetary benefits for
hearing loss disability claims).
50. Infra Part II.B.1–3.
51. 38 U.S.C. 1155 (West 2015).
52. 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(a) (2015).
53. Supra Part II.A.
54. 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b) (2015).
55. Id.
56. See id. (“To accord justice . . . to the exceptional case where the scheduler evaluations are found to be
inadequate, the Under Secretary for Benefits or the Director, Compensation and Pension Service . . . is
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The governing regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b), also states the conditions for
referral for extraschedular consideration, in that the disability must present “such
an exceptional or unusual disability picture with such related factors as marked
interference with employment or frequent periods of hospitalization” to make the
57
regular rating schedule inadequate.
The Veterans Court held that the rating schedule for disabilities applies
unless there are “exceptional or unusual” factors that render application of the
rating schedule impractical, which established the VA regulation of 38 C.F.R.
58
§ 3.321(b) as Court precedent. The Veterans Court defined the test on referral
59
for extraschedular consideration in Thun v. Peake.
In a recent development at the end of 2015 in Kuppamala v. Nicholson, the
Veterans Court modified its holding as to the application of referrals of cases for
60
extraschedular consideration. The Kuppamala Court held that the Board itself
had the statutory authority to review the Director’s decisions regarding referral
on a de novo basis and had the authority to “assign an extraschedular rating when
61
appropriate.”
2. The Thun v. Peake Three-Step Inquiry.
In Thun, the Court held that the VA is supposed to undertake a three-step
62
inquiry to make the determination of referral for extraschedular consideration.
The first step of the inquiry is an application of the requirements described in 38
C.F.R. § 3.321(b):
[I]f the scheduler evaluation does not contemplate the [veteran]’s level of
disability and symptomology and is found [to be] inadequate, the [VA
regional office] or Board must determine whether the [veteran]’s
exceptional disability picture exhibits other related factors such as those
63
provided by the [VA] regulation as “governing norms.”
The second step of the inquiry further applies section 3.321(b) as the VA is
supposed to determine whether there are “related factors [that] include ‘marked
authorized to approve on the basis of the criteria set forth in this paragraph an extra-schedular evaluation
commensurate with the average earning capacity impairment due exclusively to the service-connected disability
or disabilities.”).
57. Id.
58. See Fisher v. Principi, 4 Vet. App. 57, 60 (1993) (“[T]he rating schedule will apply unless there are
“exceptional or unusual” factors which render application of the schedule impractical.”).
59. Thun v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 111, 115 (2008).
60. Kuppamala v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 447, 458 (2015).
61. Id. (holding in a disability case outside the scope of this Comment that the underlying statutes that
created the Veterans Court provided the Board the power to review and assign an extraschedular rating if
appropriate).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 116 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b)(1)).
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64

interference with employment’ and ‘frequent periods of hospitalization.’” The
final step of the inquiry requires the Under Secretary for Benefits to review the
65
veteran’s claim only if both elements are present.
In Anderson v. Shinseki, the Veterans Court refined the Thun inquiry by
holding that referring to the Thun inquiry as a three-step inquiry can be
66
misleading, implying that there is a sequence of the first two steps. Accordingly,
the Thun inquiry is a required three-element test before referring any claim for an
67
extraschedular rating. As such, the first two elements do not have a required
68
order. In any event, if the Board does not refer a claim for extraschedular
consideration, the Board has an obligation to provide the veteran an “adequate
69
statement of reasons or bases for its decision not to do so.”
3. The Governing Law regarding Extraschedular Consideration for
Hearing Loss Cases.
The VA’s test for determining and rating hearing loss cases is a relatively
70
straightforward and mechanical process. Any VA medical examination and the
results therein must contain sufficient detail “that the evaluation of the claimed
71
disability will be a fully informed one.” The Board commits reversible error if
the statement of reasons or bases it provides to the veteran is a mere conclusory
72
statement that “an extraschedular evaluation is not appropriate.”
In Martinak v. Nicholson, the Veterans Court held that the VA regulation for
extraschedular consideration “does not rely exclusively on objective test results
73
to determine whether a referral for an extraschedular rating is warranted.” The
Martinak Court also held that the Secretary and the VA committed reversible
error in its decision by not including any additional description of the functional
74
effects caused by a hearing disability. This holding relied on the fact that the
Secretary of the VA circulated an internal memo within the VA affirming “the

64. Id. at 116.
65. Id.
66. Anderson v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 423, 427 (2009).
67. Id. (holding that the Thun elements are also Board reviewable).
68. See id. (stating that the steps in Thun are actually “elements that must be established”).
69. Brambley v. Principi, No. 01-1156, 17 Vet. App. 20 (2003) (quoting Colayong v. West, 12 Vet. App.
524, 537 (1999)).
70. Supra Part II.A; Lendenmann v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 345, 349 (1992).
71. Green v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 121, 124 (1991).
72. See Johnston v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 80, 86 (1997) (holding that the mere statement that “an
extraschedular evaluation is not appropriate” was not enough of an explanation).
73. Martinak v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 447, 455 (2007).
74. See id. (“[T]he Court . . . holds that, in addition to dictating objective test results, a VA audiologist
must fully describe the functional effects caused by a hearing disability in his or her final report.”).
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need for VA audiologists to describe the effect of a hearing disability on a
75
[veteran]’s occupational functional and daily activities.”
Accordingly, the Martinak Court held that “in addition to dictating objective
test results, a VA audiologist must fully describe the functional effects caused by
76
a hearing disability in his or her final report.” As such, Martinak requires that
the analysis for referral of an extraschedular hearing loss case contains both
77
objective and subjective elements.
C. An Overview of the Veterans Court.
A veteran’s case reaches the Veterans Court only after the VA and the
78
veteran exhaust all administrative avenues at the Board. The Board is the
adjudicatory branch of the VA, which oversees all veterans’ affairs in the United
79
States and, until 1988, these decisions were outside the scope of judicial
80
review. The Court now issues holdings regarding the validity of Board decisions
81
on denied claims of veterans’ compensation benefits.
Congress granted the Veterans Court the exclusive jurisdiction to review
82
decisions of the Board that the veteran has appealed. The Court’s holdings on
these contested Board decisions typically lack precedential weight because of the
83
84
Court’s unique procedural rules and limited judicial review. Accordingly,
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See discussion supra Part II.B.3 (explaining the requirements regarding referral for extraschedular
consideration in hearing loss disability claims).
78. See Howard v. Gober, 220 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that the “Court of Appeals for
Veteran Claims correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction” when there was no final decision from the Board of
Veteran Appeals); 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) (West 2015) (stating that an appeal should be made after a “final
decision” of the Board of Veteran Appeals).
79. 38 U.S.C. §§ 7103, 7104 (West 2015).
80. History, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/history.php
(last visited Dec. 31, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
81. Veterans’ Benefits Improvement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100 P.L. 687, 102 Stat. 4105 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.).
82. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (West 2015).
83. U.S. VET. APP. R. 30(a).
A party, intervenor, or amicus curiae may not cite as precedent any action designated as
nonprecedential by the Court or any other court, or that was withdrawn after having been published
in a reporter, except when the cited action has binding or preclusive effect in the case on appeal
(such as via the application of the law-of-the-case doctrine). Actions designated as nonprecedential
by this Court or any other court may be cited only for the persuasive value of their logic and
reasoning, provided that the party states that no clear precedent exists on point and the party includes
a discussion of the reasoning as applied to the instant case. With the exception of decisions of this
Court available electronically, a copy of any unpublished action referred to shall be attached to the
document containing the reference.
Id. (describing the version of the rule currently in effect).
84. See 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c) (West 2015) (“In no event shall findings of fact made by the Secretary or the
Board of Veterans’ Appeals be subject to trial de novo by the [Veterans] Court”).
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appealed veterans’ disability cases that do not trigger precedential review and
have identical facts can, and often do, result in disparate outcomes under the
85
same laws, depending on the disability case.
The Veterans Court’s judicial review focuses exclusively on the record of
86
proceedings presented before the Secretary of the VA and the Board. Pursuant
to statute, the Veterans Court has the authority to: (1) decide all relevant
questions of law; (2) interpret constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions;
and (3) determine the meaning or the applicability of the terms of actions of the
87
Secretary of the VA.
For findings of material fact, the Veterans Court can only set aside or reverse
88
if the finding is “clearly erroneous.” However, the Veterans Court requires that
the Board include “a written statement of the reasons or bases for its findings and
89
conclusions” in its decision. This statement of reasons or bases “must be
adequate to enable a veteran to understand the precise basis for the Board’s
90
decision and facilitate review in the Court.”
By default at the Veterans Court, a single judge can adjudicate a veterans’
91
claim for disability benefits under Rule 30(a). The appropriate factors for
deciding a case under Rule 30(a) are limited to the conditions that the claim:
[1] does not establish a new rule of law; [2] does not alter, modify,
criticize, or clarify an existing rule of law; [3] does not apply an
established rule of law to a novel fact pattern; [4] does not constitute the
only recent, binding precedent on a particular point of law within the
power of the [Veterans] Court to decide; [5] does not involve a legal

85. Compare Kennison v. McDonald, No. 14-3729, 2015 WL 4879201 (Vet. App. Aug. 17, 2015), with
McSparrin v. McDonald, No. 14-2417, 2015 WL 4756508 (Vet. App. Aug. 12, 2015) (focusing on the Board’s
decision to deny consideration of the veteran’s claim for extraschedular consideration as to hearing loss,
whether the Board incorporated the veteran’s statements as to his disability in providing adequate reasons or
bases); see also Ridgway, supra note 12, at pp. 28–33 (describing the two most common scenarios for disparate
outcomes at the Veterans Court: mental health disability cases and hearing loss disability cases).
86. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(b) (West 2015); Rogozinski v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App.19, 20 (1990).
87. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7261(a)(1)–(2) (West 2015) (stating that the Court also has the authority to compel
action of the Secretary if the Secretary acts unlawfully or unreasonably delays a proceeding).
88. Id. at § 7261(a)(4); see also id. § 7261(a)(3)(A) (stating that the Veterans Court has the authority to
use the arbitrary and capricious standard to hold unlawful and set aside decisions, findings, conclusions, rules
and regulations issued or adopted by the Secretary, or the Board); infra Part II.D (explaining the definition of
the “clearly erroneous” standard).
89. Allday v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 517, 527 (1995) (citation omitted); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App.
49, 56–57 (1990) (citing SEC v. Chenery (Chenery II) 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (analogizing the requirement to
have administrative decisions be supported by “reasons or bases”)); see 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1) (2015) (“Each
decision of the Board shall include a written statement of the Board’s findings and conclusions, and the reasons
or bases for those findings and conclusions, on all material issues of fact and law presented on the record.”).
90. 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1); Allday, 7 Vet. App. at 527 (citation omitted).
91. See Frankel v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 23, 25 (1990) (“The Court may hear cases by judges sitting
alone or in panels . . .”) (citing 38 U.S.C.A § 4054(b)).
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issue of continuing public interest; and [6] the outcome [of the case] is
92
not reasonably debatable.
93

These factors are the Frankel factors. Accordingly, using the Frankel
factors, single-judge Veterans Law cases decided under Rule 30(a) typically lack
94
precedential weight.
95
The Secretary of the VA cannot seek review of any decision of the Board.
However, if the veteran in a case decided under the Frankel factors by a single
96
judge disagrees with the decision, the veteran has two options. The veteran may
either make a motion for reconsideration by the judge who decided the case or
97
make a motion for a panel decision of three judges. Pursuant to the Court rules,
the veteran has to state either the law or the facts that the veteran believes the
98
Court overlooked or misunderstood, or state why the Frankel factors do not
99
apply.
Currently, the Veterans Court is restrictive in how it issues precedential
100
decisions. Assuming a panel is convened, the Court will randomly assign three
judges to decide the case if the veteran’s case does not meet the Frankel factors
101
and the panel’s published decision has
for single-judge consideration,
102
precedential value. If the veteran disagrees with the panel’s decision, the
veteran can make a motion for reconsideration by the panel of three judges, or
103
make a motion for full Court review.
A motion for full Veterans Court review must state how the review will
secure or maintain uniformity of the Court’s decisions or state what question of
104
exceptional importance is involved. However, the Veterans Court does not
105
favor motions for full Court decisions. If the veteran disagrees with the full
92. Id. at 25–26.
93. Id.
94. See id. (holding that a decision may be reviewed by one judge and, upon review, it will use the listed
factors).
95. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (West 2015).
96. U.S. VET. APP. R. 35.
97. U.S. VET. APP. R. 35(a)–(b) (stating that a veteran in a single motion can request both reconsideration
by the single judge and request a panel decision of three judges in the event the single judge denies
reconsideration).
98. U.S. VET. APP. R. 35(e)(1).
99. U.S. VET. APP. R. 35(e)(2).
100. See generally Frankel v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 23, 25–26 (1990) (“By statute, this Court may sit by
single judge, in panels of three or [by the full Court]. . . . Single judges will consider and decide cases identified
for summary consideration and decision. Under the internal operating procedures of the Court, there will be
internal circulation of a proposed decision with time and opportunity for non-sitting judges to respond.”).
101. Id. at 25–26.
102. Id. at 26.
103. U.S. VET. APP. R. 35(a)(1) (stating that the veteran in a single motion can request reconsideration by
the panel of three judges and request full Court review in the event that the panel denies reconsideration).
104. U.S. VET. APP. R. 35(e)(3)(A)–(B).
105. U.S. VET. APP. R. 35(c).
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Court decision, the veteran may make a motion for reconsideration by the full
106
Court, or appeal his claim to the United States Court of Appeals of the Federal
107
Circuit (Federal Circuit).
D. The “Clearly Erroneous” Standard used for Reviewing Agency Findings of
Material Fact
The Veterans Court uses the “clearly erroneous” standard when reviewing
108
agency findings of material fact. The Supreme Court defined the “clearly
erroneous” standard as a finding “when although there is evidence to support [the
agency’s finding of material fact], the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
109
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
The Supreme Court, in a later case, also held that the “clearly erroneous”
standard does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding of a lower court
or agency because the court is convinced that it would have decided the case
110
differently, because this action would be an overreach of judicial authority. The
Supreme Court held that “[w]here there are two permissible views of the
111
evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be “clearly erroneous.”
Accordingly, in Gilbert v. Derwinski, the Veterans Court stated that it would
use the “clearly erroneous” standard to review the VA’s findings of material fact
by holding that:
Congress has provided that this Court . . . to the extent necessary to its
decision and when presented, shall . . . in the case of a finding a material
fact made in reaching a decision in a case before the Department of
Veterans Affairs with respect to [the] benefits under laws administered
by the Department of Veterans Affairs, hold unlawful and set aside such
112
finding if the finding is clearly erroneous.
Moreover, the Gilbert Court also supported its decision to use the “clearly
erroneous” standard by referencing the legislative history of the statute that
113
created the Veterans Court. Moreover, the Gilbert Court cited Gypsum and
106. U.S. VET. APP. R. 35(a)(1).
107. It is worth noting that the veteran always has the option to appeal to the Federal Circuit, regardless
of seeking a panel decision or a full court decision. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a) (West 2015).
108. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 52 (1990) (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 4061(a)(4) (1988)); see also
THE LAW DICTIONARY, What is Material Fact?, http://thelawdictionary.org/material-fact/ (last accessed Dec.
29, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that a “material fact” is a fact
“crucial to the interpretation of a subject matter, or to the determination of the issue at hand”).
109. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
110. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985).
111. Id. at 574 (citing United States v. Yellow Cab Co. 338 U.S. 338, 342 (1949)).
112. Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 52 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 4061(a)(4) (1988)).
113. Id. at 52–53 (referencing 38 U.S.C. §§ 4051–4092 (1988) (codifying the creation of the Veterans
Court); 134 Cong. Rec. S16648 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1988) (statement of Sen. Cranston); 134 Cong. Rec. H10360
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Anderson in its reasoning, while analogizing its own oversight role of the Board
114
to an appellate court reviewing a trial court. The Gilbert Court held that under
the “clearly erroneous” rule, the Court could not substitute its judgment for that
115
of the Board on issues of material fact. Accordingly, if there is a plausible basis
in the record for the Board’s factual determinations, even if the Court would have
reached a different conclusion, the Court cannot overturn the Board’s decision on
116
findings of material fact.
III. ANALYSIS OF DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN HEARING LOSS CASES AT THE
VETERANS COURT
The following Sections focus on the noncompensable hearing loss cases of
117
McSparrin and Kennison, and the scope of disparate outcomes in the Veterans
118
Court when compared to the Court’s overall caseload. This Part also discusses
that the Veterans Court has recognized the problem of disparate outcomes and
119
discusses the Veterans Court’s attempt to fix it by altering Rule 30(a).
A. Introduction to Disparate Outcomes in Hearing Loss Cases at the Veterans
Court: McSparrin v. McDonald and Kennison v. McDonald
Comparing disability claims on a strict one-to-one ratio is the best way to
120
understand the problem of disparate outcomes. While the number of hearing
loss cases is a fraction of the cases the Veterans Court adjudicates in a year, the
fact remains that certain cases at the Veterans Court result in disparate
121
outcomes. People lose confidence in the law when, under the same facts, two
122
entirely different results occur each having the force of law. In addition, this

(daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (showing that Congress wanted the Court to mirror
Article III courts).
114. Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 53.
115. Id. at 52.
116. Id.
117. Infra Part III.A.
118. Infra Part III.B.
119. Infra Part III.C.
120. See infra Part III.A–B (using a one-to-one ratio to analyze disparate outcomes in hearing loss cases
at the Veterans Court).
121. See infra Part III (analyzing instances of disparate outcomes); see generally 2015 Veteran Benefits
Admin. Rep., Compensation at 26 (stating that 250,436 of the 1,642,994 (approx. 15.24%) of all new
compensation recipients in 2015 were auditory).
122. See JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION; WITH REFERENCES TO
THE CIVIL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF FOREIGN LAW 283 (T. & J. W. Johnson, Law Booksellers, 1839)
[hereinafter Bouvier Law Dictionary] (“[T]he decision of courts of justice: when exactly in point with a case
before the court, they are generally held to have a binding authority, as well to keep the scale of justice even and
steady, as because the law in that case has been solemnly declared and determined.”).
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Comment builds upon previous work that has come before on disparate outcomes
123
at the Veterans Court in more detail to better illustrate the problem. For
veterans and the American public to have confidence in Veterans Court
124
decisions, there must be consistency of fair results.
1. McSparrin v. McDonald
125

William McSparrin served with the U.S. Army. Shortly after his honorable
126
discharge, Mr. McSparrin applied for benefits stemming from hearing loss. In
127
June 1980, the VA examined him. In July 1980, the VA regional office granted
128
his hearing loss disability claim at a non-compensable rating.
In July 2003, Mr. McSparrin unsuccessfully sought an increased disability
129
rating for his hearing loss disability claim. In October 2007, Mr. McSparrin
again sought an increased disability rating for his hearing loss claim; and in
130
December 2007, the VA examined him via audiometric examination. However,
131
in July 2008, the VA regional office denied his request.
In December 2009, Mr. McSparrin testified to the Board that “he had to lip
read because he could not hear well,” and his wife added “he could ‘hear
132
nothing’ in the presence of background noise.” Accordingly, in November

123. See Ridgway, supra note 12, at pp. 33–34 (discussing disparate outcomes for all Veterans Court
single-judge decisions over a two-year period in 2013 and 2014).
124. See Bouvier Law Dictionary, supra note 122.
125. Brief of Appellant at 1–2, McSparrin v. McDonald, No. 14-2417, 2015 WL 4756508 (Vet. App.
Aug. 12, 2015) (stating that Mr. McSparrin worked as a heavy construction equipment operator during his
service from 1971 to 1979 and as a truck driver in civilian life from 1983 to 2000).
126. Brief of Appellant at 1, McSparrin, 2015 WL 4756508 (Vet. App. Aug. 12, 2015).
127. McSparrin, 2015 WL 4756508, at *2 (Vet. App. Aug. 12, 2015).
128. Brief of Appellant at 1–2, McSparrin, 2015 WL 4756508 (Vet. App. Aug. 12, 2015) (stating that Mr.
McSparrin did not contest this decision at the time, and a result, the decision became final); see also McSparrin,
2015 WL 4756508 at *1 n.1 (holding also references what the Court does with Mr. McSparrin’s other disability
benefit claims, which fall outside the scope of the Comment).
129. McSparrin, 2015 WL 4756508, at *2 (stating that in January 2004, the VA regional office continued
the noncompensable rating which Mr. McSparrin did not contest which became final).
130. Id. at n.2 (stating Mr. McSparrin had sensorineural hearing loss, which is defined as “hearing loss
due to a lesion in either the cochlea (sensory mechanism of the ear), the vestibulocochlear nerve, the central
neural pathways, or a combination of these structures”) (citing DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 825 (32nd ed. 2012)). As previously mentioned, the VA regulations that govern audiometric
examination define it as follows: 38 C.F.R. § 4.85 (2015) (stating that examinations for hearing impairment
must be conducted by a state-licensed audiologist and must include a controlled speech discrimination test and a
puretone audiometry test); 38 C.F.R. § 4.86 (2015) (stating that the test results meet a decibel threshold, the
results of examinations will be compared to predefined Hertz levels to determine whether a claim for benefits
should be awarded, with the worst result controlling the award, with ear being evaluated).
131. Id. at *2 (stating the VA continued the assigned noncompensable disability rating and Mr.
McSparrin submitted a Notice of Disagreement challenging the VA’s decision to the Board).
132. Id.
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2011, the Board remanded Mr. McSparrin’s hearing loss disability claim “for
133
additional development,” requesting another audiometric examination.
When Mr. McSparrin underwent that examination in January 2012, he
reported to the examiner that he encountered loud noises throughout his military
134
tour that damaged his hearing. Mr. McSparrin reported he had a hard time
135
The VA examiner acknowledged Mr.
hearing at work and at home.
136
McSparrin’s hearing loss may cause him occupational issues. While the
examiner found hearing loss, the Board decided that his hearing loss was not
137
severe enough to qualify for a compensable disability rating. Accordingly, the
Board found Mr. McSparrin’s hearing loss disability merited only a
noncompensable rating and that “referral for extraschedular consideration was
138
not warranted.”
Mr. McSparrin appealed to the Veterans Court and argued that the Board
provided inadequate reasons or bases for denying referral for extraschedular
139
consideration. Mr. McSparrin argued for remand because the Board failed to
discuss in its analysis whether his reliance on face-to-face communication caused
140
marked interference with his employment.
The Secretary of the VA argued that the Veterans Court cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the Board under the “clearly erroneous” standard on issues
of material fact, and that “if a ‘plausible’ basis appears in the record for the
141
factual determination, the Court cannot overturn them.” The Secretary also
argued that the threshold factor of referral for extraschedular consideration in the

133. Id. at *3 (stating that the VA examiner was to fully describe any functional effects associated with
Mr. McSparrin’s hearing disability, the impact of his hearing loss disability upon his vocational pursuits, and
the effect the disability has, if any, on his current level of occupational impairment in his report).
134. Id. (referencing noise via earth movers, heavy equipment, and assorted weapon fire from various
forms of weaponry on the firing range).
135. Id. (stating that it was hard to hear general conversation and communication on the CB radio in the
truck, and that Mr. McSparrin was unable to understand lyrics in music and had to rely on face-to-face
communication).
136. Id. (“He may have trouble working well in very noisy environments, and in environments which
required him to use non face-to-face communications equipment (such as CB radios, intercoms, etc.) or in jobs
which required a great deal of attention to high[-]pitched sounds (such as monitoring medical equipment or
other altering signals.”)).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at *3–4 (Vet. App. Aug. 12, 2015); Brief of Appellant at 7, McSparrin, 2015 WL 4756508 (Vet.
App. Aug. 12, 2015) (arguing that the Board also failed to compare the severity and symptoms of his disability
with the established rating schedule for hearing loss disabilities) (citing Thun v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 111, 115
(2008)).
140. Brief of Appellant at 8, McSparrin, 2015 WL 4756508 (Vet. App. Aug. 12, 2015) (arguing that
inability to communicate on a CB radio interfered with his work as a truck driver).
141. Brief for the Appellee at 3–4, McSparrin, 2015 WL 4756508 (Vet. App. Aug. 12, 2015) (arguing
also that Mr. McSparrin’s hearing loss did not meet the criteria for a compensable rating).
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142

Thun inquiry is whether the available rating schedule is adequate. Ultimately,
the Secretary argued that the Board properly conducted the Thun inquiry by
acknowledging and incorporating Mr. McSparrin’s statements to the VA
examiner about his hearing loss in its final reasoning that denied referral for
143
extraschedular consideration.
On August 12, 2015, Chief Judge Lawrence B. Hagel affirmed the Board’s
144
decision. Chief Judge Hagel cited the Veterans Court’s three-element test
145
established by Thun to satisfy the requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b). Chief
Judge Hagel cited the relevant portion in Martinak, which provides that the VA
audiologist must “fully describe the functional effects caused by a hearing
146
disability in his or her final report.” Chief Judge Hagel held that the Board
properly considered Mr. McSparrin’s symptoms and lay statements about his
147
disability in its decision to not refer the claim for extraschedular consideration,
and that the Board was correct in finding that Mr. McSparrin had not described
148
exceptional or unusual features to his hearing loss.
Accordingly, Mr. McSparrin failed to demonstrate error, making remand
149
unnecessary. Chief Judge Hagel concluded that the Board’s corresponding
explanation adequately allowed Mr. McSparrin to understand the precise basis of
150
its decision not to refer his claim for extraschedular consideration.
2. Kennison v. McDonald
151

Everett Kennison served with the U.S. Army on two non-consecutive tours.
In March 2010, Mr. Kennison filed for entitlement to disability benefits for

142. Brief for the Appellee at 6, McSparrin, 2015 WL 4756508 (Vet. App. Aug. 12, 2015) (arguing also
that the test on referral for extraschedular consideration is not whether the rating schedule precisely describes
Mr. McSparrin’s level of severity and symptoms) (citing Thun, 22 Vet. App. at 115).
143. Brief for the Appellee at 9, McSparrin, 2015 WL 4756508 (Vet. App. Aug. 12, 2015) (arguing that if
one Thun element is absent in the claim, analysis can stop and referral is not required).
144. McSparrin, 2015 WL 4756508, at *7 (Vet. App. Aug. 12, 2015).
145. Id. at *4 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b)(1) (2015)).
146. Id. at *5 (holding that the disability rating for a hearing loss disability claim is assigned through a
mechanical application of the VA audiometric evaluation and that the Board properly conducted this analysis)
(referencing Lendenmann v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 345, 349 (1992); and quoting Martinak v. Nicholson, 21 Vet.
App. 447, 454–55 (2007)).
147. McSparrin, 2015 WL 4756508, at *5 (“Mr. McSparrin’s degree of bilateral hearing loss can cause
significant communication problems and that he may have trouble working in very noisy environments, as well
as environments that require him to use non face-to-face communications equipment, or in jobs that require
attention to high pitched sounds.”).
148. Id. (holding also that the Board’s analysis of the first Thun element, whether the disability is unique
or exceptional, was correct).
149. Id.
150. Id. at *7 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1); Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff’d per
curiam, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (table); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 57 (1990)).
151. Kennison v. McDonald, No. 14-3729, 2015 WL 4879201, at *1 (Vet. App. Aug. 17, 2015) (stating
the two tours were from September 1974 to January 1975 and from March 1977 to October 1978).
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hearing loss and, in November 2010, the VA regional office granted the claim
152
and assigned a noncompensable disability rating.
In December 2010, Mr. Kennison filed a Notice of Disagreement, arguing
that “he [was] not able to hear [his] spouse’s voice at all,” that she had to tap him
153
to get his attention, and that he had to read lips to understand people. At Mr.
Kennison’s VA examination in December 2011, the examiner noted that Mr.
Kennison’s hearing loss impacted his ability to work due to his difficulty
154
understanding speech.
In July 2012, after appealing to the Board, Mr. Kennison underwent another
VA examination where the examiner noted that Mr. Kennison’s hearing loss
impacted his ability to work since it negatively affected his ability to
155
communicate. In October 2014, the Board found that Mr. Kennison’s hearing
loss disability merited only a noncompensable rating and that referral for
156
157
extraschedular consideration was not warranted, much like Mr. McSparrin.
Moreover, Mr. Kennison appealed to the Veterans Court and argued that the
Board provided inadequate reasons for denying referral for extraschedular
158
consideration, making the same argument as Mr. McSparrin. Like Mr.
McSparrin, Mr. Kennison argued for remand because the Board failed to discuss
in its analysis the effects of his hearing loss beyond a conclusory statement that
159
his disability is not so unusual or exceptional as to warrant a higher rating.
As in McSparrin, the Secretary of the VA argued that the Veterans Court
cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Board under the “clearly erroneous”
standard on issues of material fact, and if a plausible basis appears in the record
160
for the factual determination, the Court cannot overturn the Board’s decision.
Additionally, as in McSparrin, the Secretary argued that the threshold factor of
referral for extraschedular consideration in the Thun inquiry is whether the
161
available rating schedule is adequate. Finally, just like in McSparrin, the
Secretary argued that the Board properly conducted the Thun inquiry by
152. Id.
153. Id. at *2.
154. Brief of Appellant at 2, Kennison, 2015 WL 4879201.
155. Id.
156. Kennison, 2015 WL 4879201, at *2.
157. Supra Part III.A.1.
158. Supra Part III.A.1; Brief of Appellant at 3, Kennison, 2015 WL 4879201 at 1 (Vet. App. Aug. 17,
2015).
159. Supra Part III.A.1; Brief of Appellant at 2–3, 5–6, Kennison, 2015 WL 4879201 (Vet. App. Aug. 17,
2015) (arguing that the Veterans Court found reversible error when the VA only provided a conclusory
statement) (citing Johnson v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 80, 86 (1997)).
160. Supra Part III.A.1; Brief for the Appellee at 6, Kennison, 2015 WL 4879201 (Vet. App. Aug. 17
2015) (citing Thun v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. at 111, 115 (2008)) (holding that where there are two permissible
views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be “clearly erroneous”); Gilbert v.
Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990); and Anderson v. Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).
161. Supra Part III.A.1; Brief for the Appellee at 5–6, Kennison, 2015 WL 4879201 (Vet. App. Aug. 17,
2015).
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acknowledging and incorporating Mr. Kennison’s statements to the VA examiner
about his hearing loss in its final reasoning that denied referral for extraschedular
162
consideration.
163
On August 17, 2015, Judge Coral W. Pietsch vacated the Board’s decision.
Judge Pietsch cited the Veterans Court’s three-element test established by Thun
164
to satisfy the requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b). Judge Pietsch cited the
“clearly erroneous” standard and noted the Board must provide a written
statement of the reasons for its factual findings to enable the veteran to
165
understand the precise basis of its decision.
Judge Pietsch held that the Board did not properly consider Mr. Kennison’s
symptoms and lay statements about his disability because it failed to include
enough of Mr. Kennison’s lay statements about his hearing loss in its final report
166
and decision to not refer the claim for extraschedular consideration.
Specifically, Judge Pietsch emphasized that the Board incorrectly focused solely
167
on Mr. Kennison’s statements from one examination. In her reasoning, Judge
Pietsch cited to testimony in the record before the Court that neither side used in
168
their arguments.
On remand, Judge Pietsch held that the Board must analyze Mr. Kennison’s
169
credibility and competency. If the Board finds Mr. Kennison credible and
competent, then the Board should compare the rating schedule to Mr. Kennison’s
170
symptoms.

162. Brief for the Appellee at 5–6, 8, Kennison, 2015 WL 4879201 (Vet. App. Aug. 17, 2015) (arguing
that if one Thun element is absent in the claim, analysis can stop and referral is not required) (citing Thun, 22
Vet. App. at 115; Anderson v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 423, 427 (2009); 38 C.F.R § 3.321(b) (2015)).
163. Kennison, 2015 WL 4879201, at *5 (Vet. App. Aug. 17, 2015) (holding that remand to the Board
was the appropriate remedy).
164. Id. at *2–3 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b)(1)).
165. Kennison, 2015 WL 4879201, at *3–4 (Vet. App. Aug. 17, 2015) (citing 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1)
(West 2015)); Allday v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 517, 527 (1995); Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 56–57.
166. Kennison, 2015 WL 4879201, at *4 (holding that while the majority of the Board’s analysis focused
on the first Thun element, the Board’s error occurred by failing “to discuss a majority of [Mr. Kennison]’s lay
statements describing the effects of his disorder.”).
167. Id. at *4 (referring to Mr. Kennison’s testimony on page 123 of the record and holding that the
Board’s inclusion of the December 2011 remarks at the expense of any other of his other lay statements appears
to suggest that the Board believed that his hearing loss symptoms were less severe than they actually were).
168. Id.
169. Id. (citing Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007); and Buchanan v. Nicholson,
451 F.3d 1331, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
170. Kennison, 2015 WL 4879201, at *4–5 (holding that if the Board finds that the rating schedule
adequately describes Mr. Kennison’s symptoms, there should be no referral for extraschedular consideration,
otherwise full Thun analysis is required).
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3. The Disparate Outcomes in Hearing Loss Cases Demonstrated by
McSparrin and Kennison
Due to the version of Rule 30(a) in force at the time of both cases, both cases
have equal force of law and cannot serve as precedent for any veteran going
171
forward. With the Veterans Court’s alteration to Rule 30(a), veterans can only
cite to single-judge decisions for the “persuasive value of their logic and
reasoning,” and considering how similar the reasoning in both cases is, that rule
172
does not appear to be very helpful.
As demonstrated, McSparrin and Kennison are similar in the underlying facts
173
and the underlying laws used. The critical distinction between the two cases is
how the judges treated the Board’s handling of the veterans’ lay testimony
174
regarding his disability hearing loss claim. However, other than the outcome,
there are two primary differences between McSparrin and Kennison: McSparrin
175
does not discuss the “clearly erroneous” standard, and Kennison does not
176
discuss the Martinak decision. These differences do not explain the disparate
177
outcomes. Binding precedent and statutes require the Veterans Court to use the
178
“clearly erroneous” standard, so by default McSparrin used the “clearly
179
erroneous” standard.
Martinak held the VA was to describe the functional effects of the veteran’s
180
hearing disability in the final report. Judge Pietsch held that the Board did not
181
discuss enough of Mr. Kennison’s statement without mentioning Martinak.
This decision is puzzling considering that both Mr. Kennison and the VA argued
182
about Martinak in their respective briefs to the Court.

171. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 52–53 (1990); U.S. VET. APP. R. 30(a) (stating the version of
the rule that was in effect at the time).
172. November 2015 Veterans Court Order, supra note 21.
173. Supra Part III.A.1–2.
174. Compare Kennison, 2015 WL 4879201, at *4–5 with McSparrin v. McDonald, No. 14-2417, 2015
WL 4756508, at *5–6 (Vet. App. Aug. 12, 2015) (arguing that the cases ultimately were judged on the quality
of the Board’s analysis).
175. McSparrin, 2015 WL 4756508, at *5–6.
176. Kennison, 2015 WL 4879201, at *4–5.
177. See discussion supra Part III.A.3 (arguing that the minor differences in the cases should not have
resulted in different outcomes in McSparrin and Kennison).
178. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(4) (West 2015); Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573
(1985); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
179. See McSparrin, 2015 WL 4756508, at *7 (McSparrin does cite Gilbert in a parenthetical albeit for a
different, unrelated issue).
180. Martinak v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 447, 454–55 (2007).
181. Kennison, 2015 WL 4879201, at *4–5.
182. Brief of Appellant at 6, Kennison, 2015 WL 4879201 (Vet. App. Aug. 17, 2015); Brief for the
Appellee at 9–10, Kennison, 2015 WL 4879201 (Vet. App. Aug. 17, 2015).
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The fact remains that both noncompensable disability hearing loss cases
183
resulted in two entirely different outcomes. However, a true examination would
likely require comparing McSparrin to a veteran’s case with identical facts that
also cites Martinak in the decision. The cases of Gale Gundersdorff illustrate the
184
moving target that is judicial consistency at the Veterans Court.
4. Gundersdorff v. Shinseki and Gundersdorff v. McDonald
185

Gale E. Gundersdorff served in the U.S. Army. During her service, Ms.
Gundersdorff successfully applied for disability benefits for a hearing loss
186
187
claim. In May 2005, the VA granted the claim at a noncompensable level. In
2012, Ms. Gundersdorff complained to her VA examiner of difficulty hearing the
television and in-person conversations and unsuccessfully tried to increase her
188
disability rating for her hearing loss. In April 2012, the Board maintained the
189
rating and denied referral for extraschedular consideration.
Ms. Gundersdorff appealed to the Veterans Court and, like in McSparrin and
Kennison, she argued that the Board provided an inadequate explanation of its
190
decision to not refer her hearing loss claim for extraschedular consideration. As
the claimants did in McSparrin and Kennison, the veteran argued that the Board
failed to consider her lay statements about her disability, while the Secretary
argued that the Board properly conducted the Thun analysis required for
191
extraschedular consideration.
On March 27, 2014, Judge William S. Greenberg vacated the Board’s
192
decision. Citing Martinak, Judge Greenberg held that the VA’s examiners
failed to adequately describe the functional effects of Ms. Gundersdorff’s
193
disability in the final report. In addition, like in Kennison, Judge Greenberg
took issue with the Board ignoring other lay statements that Ms. Gundersdorff

183. Supra Part III.A.
184. Infra Part III.A.4.
185. Gundersdorff v. Shinseki, No. 13-123, 2014 WL 1246682, at *2 (Vet. App. Mar. 27, 2014) (stating
that Ms. Gundersdorff worked in personnel system management and public affairs); see also Gundersdorff v.
McDonald, No. 14-4376, 2015 WL 7696304, at *2 (Vet. App. Nov. 30, 2015) (stating that her service was from
July 1980 to December 2004). For clarity, the 2015 Gundersdorff case is short-cited as Gundersdorff II.
186. Gundersdorff, 2014 WL 1246682, at *2.
187. Id.
188. Id. (arguing that the VA providing a TV amplifier and hearing aids was insufficient to cope with
Gundersdorff’s disability).
189. Id.
190. Supra Part III.A.1–2; Gundersdorff, 2014 WL 1246682, at *3.
191. Supra Part III.A.1–2; Gundersdorff, 2014 WL 1246682, at *2–4.
192. Gundersdorff, 2014 WL 1246682, at *5.
193. Id. at *4 (holding where VA’s statement that Ms. Gundersdorff’s hearing difficulty as having a
significant effect on her occupation was inadequate alone as a description of her symptoms).
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194

made in previous examinations in the final report. On remand, Judge Greenberg
195
ordered the Board to consider additional evidence.
In November 2014, the Board received the case and again denied Ms.
196
Gundersdorff referral for extraschedular consideration for her hearing loss case.
Accordingly, Ms. Gundersdorff appealed to the Veterans Court and argued,
similar to McSparrin and Kennison, that the Board failed to provide an adequate
197
explanation in its denial of referral. The Secretary made the same arguments as
198
before.
On November 30, 2015, Judge William S. Greenberg again vacated the
199
Board’s decision to deny referral for extraschedular consideration. Without
citing Martinak, Judge Greenberg held that the Board insufficiently explained its
decision by including in its report Ms. Gundersdorff’s statement that she
“struggled to comprehend verbal conversation and [that she had] difficulty
200
hearing the television.” This decision not to cite Martinak is curious
201
considering that the previous decision used Martinak in its rationale, and the
parties were actively arguing about Martinak in their respective briefs to the
202
203
Court. In any event, Ms. Gundersdorff’s claim returned to the Board.
B. Statistical Evidence that Proves McSparrin and Kennison are Emblematic of
the Disparate Outcome Problem at the Veterans Court
The simplest way to demonstrate that cases like McSparrin and Kennison are
not outliers and are demonstrative of the disparate outcome problem is to
compare these cases to all the single-judge hearing loss cases decided over the
past six years at the Veterans Court to see if other cases are resulting in the same
204
pattern.

194. Supra Part III.A.2; Gundersdorff, 2014 WL 1246682, at *4–5 (holding that the VA’s omission of
additional lay statements frustrated judicial review).
195. Gundersdorff, 2014 WL 1246682, at *5.
196. Gundersdorff v. Shinseki, No. 14-4376, 2015 WL 7696304, at *1 (Vet. App. Nov. 30, 2015).
197. Id. at *1; see discussion supra Part III.A.3 (explaining the similarity of the veterans’ arguments in
McSparrin and Kennison).
198. Brief for the Appellee at 5, Gundersdorff II, 2015 WL 7696304 (Vet. App. Nov. 30, 2015).
199. Gundersdorff II, 2015 WL 7696304, at *5.
200. Id. at *4–5 (holding that the VA’s explanation was inadequate because it did not provide detail
explaining how Ms. Gundersdorff’s hearing loss was contemplated by the rating schedule).
201. Gundersdorff v. Shinseki, No. 13-123, 2014 WL 1246682, at *2 (Vet. App. Mar. 27, 2014).
202. Brief of Appellant at 5, Gundersdorff II, 2015 WL 7696304; Brief for the Appellee at 5,
Gundersdorff II, 2015 WL 7696304.
203. Gundersdorff II, 2015 WL 7696304, at *5.
204. Infra Part III.B.
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1. The General Results of all Cases at the Veterans Court over the Past Six
Years
As previously stated, the Veterans Court maintains the exclusive jurisdiction
205
to review contested Board decisions. The number of total cases and the length
of time for their adjudication only emphasize how important it is for the Veterans
Court to come to consistent outcomes, lest the veteran endure an unnecessary
206
procedural delay.
This Comment averages the Court’s caseload for the past six years by
calculating the average number of single-judge decisions for all filed disability
cases. From the fiscal years of 2010 to 2015, the Veterans Court decided an
207
average of about 1,830 single-judge cases a year. During this timeframe, the
Veterans Court affirmed in full or in part an average of about 957 disability cases
208
of all types each year, an affirmance rate of 52.3 percent. During this
timeframe, the Veterans Court remanded or reversed an average of about 616

205. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (West 2015).
206. See infra Part III.B.1 (explaining the data that demonstrates how long the Veterans Court takes to
decide disability claim cases).
207. Note: Fiscal Year shortens to (FY) for calculation purposes. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR
VETERANS CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORTS, FISCAL YEAR 2015 at 2, https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/
FY2015AnnualReport.pdf (last accessed on Apr. 1, 2016) [hereinafter 2015 Veterans Court Report] (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (calculation FY 2015); U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS
CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORTS, FISCAL YEAR 2014 at 2, https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/FY2014
AnnualReport06MAR15FINAL.pdf (last accessed Jan. 4, 2016) [hereinafter 2014 Veterans Court Report] (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (calculation FY 2014); U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR
VETERANS CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORTS, FISCAL YEAR 2013 at 2, https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/
documents/FY2013AnnualReport.pdf (last accessed on Jan. 4, 2016) [hereinafter 2013 Veterans Court Report]
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (calculation FY 2013); U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR
VETERANS CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORTS, FISCAL YEAR 2012 at 2, https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/
documents/FY2012AnnualReport.pdf (last accessed on Jan. 4, 2016) [hereinafter 2012 Veterans Court Report]
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (calculation FY 2012); U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR
VETERANS CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORTS, FISCAL YEAR 2011 at 2, https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/
documents/FY_2011_Annual_Report_FINAL_Feb_29_2012_1PM_.pdf (last accessed on Jan. 4, 2016)
[hereinafter 2011 Veterans Court Report] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (calculation
FY 2011); U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORTS, FISCAL YEAR 2010 at 2,
https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/FY_2010_Annual_report_June_27 _2011_.pdf (last accessed Jan. 4,
2016) [hereinafter 2010 Veterans Court Report] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(calculation FY 2010). Calculating the single-judge cases from 2010 to 2015 and averaging them ((FY 2015
(1,313) + FY 2014 (1,615) + FY 2013 (1,672) + FY 2012 (2,179) + FY 2011 (2,242) + FY 2010 (1,955) / 6 =
1,829.33 ≈ 1,830).
208. See 2015 Veterans Court Report, supra note 207 (calculation FY 2015); 2014 Veterans Court
Report, supra note 207 (calculation FY 2014); 2013 Veterans Court Report, supra note 207 (calculation FY
2013); 2012 Veterans Court Report, supra note 207 (calculation FY 2012); 2011 Veterans Court Report, supra
note 207 (calculation FY 2011); 2010 Veterans Court Report, supra note 207 (calculation FY 2010).
Calculating the affirmance rate from 2010 to 2015 and by adding and averaging them ((FY 2015 (438+151) +
FY 2014 (578+163) + FY 2013 (703+162) + FY 2012 (1,051+231) + FY 2011 (1,044+292) + FY 2010
(727+201) / 6) = 956.83; 956.83/1,829.33 = .523).
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disability cases of all types each year, a remand rate of 33.6 percent. The
Veterans Court dismissed an average of 257 disability cases each year for various
procedural reasons that fall outside the scope of this Comment at a rate of 14
210
percent. From 2010 to 2015, the average length of time for a disability case of
any type to go from the filing of the initial appeal to disposition on the merits by
211
a single judge at the Veterans Court was about 481 days, or 17 months.
2. The Prevalence of Disparate Outcomes in Hearing Loss Cases at the
Veterans Court
The procedural rules of the Veterans Court allowed single-judge disability
212
cases to result in disparate outcomes. This Section examines how many times
there has been a split on referral for extraschedular consideration in hearing loss
213
cases in the Veterans Court during the past six–plus years.

209. See 2015 Veterans Court Report, supra note 207 (calculation FY 2015); 2014 Veterans Court
Report, supra note 207 (calculation FY 2014); 2013 Veterans Court Report, supra note 207 (calculation FY
2013); 2012 Veterans Court Report, supra note 207 (calculation FY 2012); 2011 Veterans Court Report, supra
note 207 (calculation FY 2011); 2010 Veterans Court Report, supra note 207 (calculation FY 2010).
Calculating the remand rate from 2010 to 2015 by adding and averaging them (FY 2015 (548+5) + FY 2014
(680+6) + FY 2013 (584+6) + FY 2012 (610+9) + FY 2011 (687+6) + FY 2010 (546+6) / 6) = 615.5;
615.5/1,829.33 = .336).
210. 2015 Veterans Court Report, supra notes 207–09 (calculation FY 2015); 2014 Veterans Court
Report, supra notes 207–09 (calculation FY 2014); 2013 Veterans Court Report, supra notes 207–09
(calculation FY 2013); 2012 Veterans Court Report, supra notes 207-09 (calculation FY 2012); 2011 Veterans
Court Report, supra notes 207–09 (calculation FY 2011); 2010 Veterans Court Report, supra notes 207–09
(calculation FY 2010). Calculating the remaining dismissed cases by adding up the figures and subtracting them
from the overall average, then dividing to find the percentage: (Average of 1,829.33C(Average of Affirmance
(956.83) + Average of Remand / Reversal (615.5)) = 257; 257/1,829.33 = .140).
211. See 2015 Veterans Court Report, supra note 207, at 3 (FY 2015); 2014 Veterans Court Report, supra
note 207, at 3 (FY 2014); 2013 Veterans Court Report, supra note 207, at 3 (FY 2013); 2012 Veterans Court
Report, supra note 207, at 3 (FY 2012); 2011 Veterans Court Report, supra note 207, at 3 (FY 2011); 2010
Veterans Court Report, supra note 207, at 3 (FY 2010). Calculating the processing time at the Veterans Court
by adding up the average wait time and dividing: ((FY 2015 (383) + FY 2014 (423) + FY 2013 (452) + FY
2012 (470) + FY 2011 (584) + FY 2010 (572) / 6) = 480.67; 480.67/28 = 17.2).
212. Supra Part III.B.1–3.
213. Anderson v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 423, 427 (2009) (describing the last precedent holding on
extraschedular referral which focused on a hearing loss disability claim rated 10% compensable and clarified
the requisite analysis of Thun v. Peake).
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Table 1 presents all noncompensable hearing loss cases exactly like
McSparrin and Kennison decided at the Veterans Court from Anderson in 2009
214
to the end of 2015:
Table 1 –
Noncompensable Hearing Loss Cases at the Veterans Court
from Anderson to 2015
Fiscal Year
Affirmed
Remanded
Percentages
215
2015
5
15
25%/75%
216
2014
5
9
35.7%/64.3%
217
2013
5
5
50%/50%
218
2012
3
6
33.3%/66.7%
219
2011
7
5
58.3%/41.7%
220
2010
6
3
66.7%/33.3%
2009 (starting
221
9
1
90%/10%
from Anderson)
214. Note: hearing loss cases decided on grounds other than whether the Board provided sufficient
rationale as to the referral for extraschedular consideration, such as an overarching disability outside the scope
of this Comment or other non-relevant procedural grounds are omitted from this case study.
215. See, e.g., Kennison v. McDonald, No. 14-3729, 2015 WL 4879201, at *5 (Vet. App. Aug. 17, 2015)
(providing an example of the Veterans Court’s vacatur and remand of the aforementioned set of cases in 2015);
McSparrin v. McDonald, No. 14-2417, 2015 WL 4756508 (Vet. App. Aug. 12, 2015) (providing an example of
the Veterans Court’s affirmance of the aforementioned set of cases in 2015).
216. See, e.g., Guidry v. McDonald, No. 13-2835, 2014 WL 7336953 (Vet. App. Dec. 24, 2014)
(providing an example of Veterans Court affirmance of the aforementioned set of cases in 2014); Gundersdorff
v. Shinseki, No. 13-123, 2014 WL 1246682 (Vet. App. Mar. 27, 2014) (providing an example of the Veterans
Court’s vacatur and remand of the aforementioned set of cases in 2014).
217. See, e.g., Evans v. Shinseki, No. 12-1266, 2013 WL 6511506 (Vet. App. Dec. 13, 2013) (providing
an example of Veterans Court affirmance of the aforementioned set of cases in 2013); Lundin v. Shinseki, No.
12-1193, 2013 WL 4067622 (Vet. App. Aug. 13, 2013) (providing an example of the Veterans Court’s vacatur
and remand of the aforementioned set of cases in 2013).
218. See, e.g., Trapani v. Shinseki, No. 11-3176, 2012 WL 6099063 (Vet. App. Dec. 10, 2012) (providing
an example of Veterans Court affirmance of the aforementioned set of cases in 2012); Chisholm v. Shinseki,
No. 11-2156, 2012 WL 5869380 (Vet. App. Nov. 20, 2012) (providing an example of the Veterans Court’s
vacatur and remand of the aforementioned set of cases in 2012).
219. See, e.g., Formby v. Shinseki, No. 10-1258, 2011 WL 6831956 (Vet. App. Dec. 29, 2011) (providing
an example of Veterans Court vacatur and remand of the aforementioned set of cases in 2011); Causey v.
Shinseki, No. 10-1298, 2011 WL 6382115 (Vet. App. Dec. 21, 2011) (providing an example of the Veterans
Court’s affirmance of the aforementioned set of cases in 2011).
220. See, e.g., Blackmon v. Shinseki, No. 08-2707, 2010 WL 1534200 (Vet. App. Apr. 19, 2010)
(providing an example of Veterans Court vacatur and remand of the aforementioned set of cases in 2010);
Stewart v. Shinseki, No. 08-2568, 2010 WL 318534 (Vet. App. Jan. 28, 2010) (providing an example of the
Veterans Court’s affirmance of the aforementioned set of cases in 2010).
221. Dillon v. Shinseki, No. 07-3449, 2009 WL 891078 (Vet. App. Mar. 31, 2009) (table) (holding where
the Secretary conceded that the Board provided inadequate reasons or bases in its decision not to refer the
veterans claim, the only remand); see e.g., Sangi v. Shinseki, No. 06-2721, 2009 WL 3063039 (Vet. App. Sept.
24, 2009) (providing an example of the Veterans Court vacatur and remand of the aforementioned set of cases
in 2009).
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Table 2 presents all relevant, hearing loss cases, regardless of disability
rating, decided at the Veterans Court from Anderson in 2009 to the end of 2015:
Table 2 –
All Relevant Hearing Loss Cases at the Veterans Court from
Anderson to 2015
Fiscal Year
Affirmed
Remanded
Percentages
222
2015
8
23
25.8%/74.2%
223
2014
8
15
34.8%/65.2%
224
2013
12
12
50%/50%
225
2012
8
9
47%/53%
226
2011
10
7
58.8%/41.2%
227
2010
8
4
75%/25%
2009 (starting
228
12
2
85.7%/14.3%
from Anderson)
At the time of Anderson v. Shinseki, there was near uniformity in
noncompensable and compensable hearing loss cases as evidenced by how many

222. See, e.g., Kennison v. McDonald, No. 14-3729, 2015 WL 4879201 (Vet. App. Aug. 17, 2015)
(providing an example of Veterans Court vacatur and remand of the aforementioned set of cases in 2015);
McSparrin v. McDonald, No. 14-2417, 2015 WL 4756508 (Vet. App. Aug. 12, 2015) (providing an example of
Veterans Court affirmance of the aforementioned set of cases in 2015).
223. See, e.g., Guidry v. McDonald, No. 13-2835, 2014 WL 7336953 (Vet. App. Dec. 24, 2014)
(providing an example of Veterans Court affirmance of the aforementioned set of cases in 2014); Gundersdorff
v. Shinseki, No. 13-123, 2014 WL 1246682 (Vet. App. Mar. 27, 2014) (providing an example of the Veterans
Court’s vacatur and remand of the aforementioned set of cases in 2014).
224. See, e.g., Evans v. Shinseki, No. 12-1266, 2013 WL 6511506 (Vet. App. Dec. 13, 2013) (providing
an example of Veterans Court affirmance of the aforementioned set of cases in 2013); Lundin v. Shinseki, No.
12-1193, 2013 WL 4067622 (Vet. App. Aug. 13, 2013) (providing an example of the Veterans Court’s vacatur
and remand of the aforementioned set of cases in 2013).
225. See, e.g., Trapani v. Shinseki, No. 11-3176, 2012 WL 6099063 (Vet. App. Dec. 10, 2012) (providing
an example of Veterans Court affirmance of the aforementioned set of cases in 2012); Chisholm v. Shinseki,
No. 11-2156, 2012 WL 5869380 (Vet. App. Nov. 20, 2012) (providing an example of the Veterans Court’s
vacatur and remand of the aforementioned set of cases in 2012).
226. See, e.g., Formby v. Shinseki, No. 10-1258, 2011 WL 6831956 (Vet. App. Dec. 29, 2011) (providing
an example of Veterans Court vacatur and remand of the aforementioned set of cases in 2011); Causey v.
Shinseki, No. 10-1298, 2011 WL 6382115 (Vet. App. Dec. 21, 2011) (providing an example of the Veterans
Court’s affirmance of the aforementioned set of cases in 2011).
227. See, e.g., Blackmon v. Shinseki, No. 08-2707, 2010 WL 1534200 (Vet. App. Apr. 19, 2010)
(providing an example of Veterans Court vacatur and remand of the aforementioned set of cases in 2010);
Stewart v. Shinseki, No. 08-2568, 2010 WL 318534 (Vet. App. Jan. 28, 2010) (providing an example of the
Veterans Court’s affirmance of the aforementioned set of cases in 2010).
228. See, e.g., Sangi v. Shinseki, No. 06-2721, 2009 WL 3063039 (Vet. App. Sept. 24, 2009) (providing
an example of Veterans Court vacatur and remand of the aforementioned set of cases in 2009); Ramos v.
Shinseki, No. 07-1396, 2009 WL 1617867 (Vet. App. Jun. 30, 2009) (table) (providing an example of the
Veterans Court’s affirmance of the aforementioned set of cases in 2009).

165

2016 / Disparate Outcomes in Hearing Loss Cases at the Veterans Court
229

times the Court affirmed the Board’s reasoning immediately after Anderson.
However, from 2011 to the present, there was an unexplained shift in outcomes
in these types of cases, which is puzzling due to the lack of additional
230
precedents. The pronounced shift is evident when comparing the results of the
case study discussed in Part III.B.2 to the general affirmance and remand rates of
231
the Court.
While it would be tempting to attribute the shift at the Veterans Court to a
shift in presidential administrations, the newest members of the Veterans Court
did not take the bench until 2012—well after the start of President Barack
232
Obama’s administration. The significant split in outcomes is troubling,
especially considering under the Court’s rule only allows veterans to cite these
233
cases “for the persuasive value of their logic and reasoning.” Considering the
split, the value of the Rule 30(a), as well as the reasoning of any of these cases,
234
will likely be low. It would be a mistake to dismiss these results due to the
235
small number of cases involved on a yearly basis because this analysis
demonstrates a clear trend of disparate outcomes with both noncompensable and
compensable hearing loss cases and shows the current trend at the Veterans Court
to remand hearing loss cases without any additional precedents providing
236
guidance or explanation for the decision.
It might seem artificial to pick McSparrin and Kennison because of the fiveday gap of issuance, as it may initially seem like a fluke; however, considering
that three different judges issued disparate holdings in one week in 2015, the
237
problem remains very real. In fact, in 2014, there was a single instance of

229. Table 1, supra note 221; Table 2, supra note 228.
230. Table 1, supra note 221; Table 2, supra note 228 (describing the current case law for extraschedular
referral).
231. Compare Tables 1–2, with 2015 Veterans Court Report, supra note 207, and 2014 Veterans Court
Report, supra note 207, and 2013 Veterans Court Report, supra note 207, and 2012 Veterans Court Report,
supra note 207, and 2011 Veterans Court Report, supra note 207, and 2010 Veterans Court Report, supra note
207 (demonstrating that remand and affirmance rates for all cases and hearing loss disability claims are vastly
different, which is a clear indication that something is wrong).
232. See Judges, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/
judges.php (last accessed on Feb. 21, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (stating that
Judges Coral W. Pietsch, Margaret Bartley, and William S. Greenberg took the bench in 2012).
233. U.S. VET. APP. R. 30(a).
234. See discussion supra Part III.A.1–2 (demonstrating that the similarity of the reasoning and facts in
McSparrin and Kennison resulted in two different outcomes and would not help any future veteran at the
Veterans Court).
235. See discussion supra Part III.B.1–2 (demonstrating the trend that the results of hearing loss disability
claims are in stark contrast to other results at the Veterans Court needs addressing).
236. See discussion supra Parts II.B.2–3, III.B.1–2 (demonstrating that there is no case law or shift in
case law responsible for disparate outcomes at the Veterans Court since 2009).
237. Warlick v. McDonald, No. 14-3109, 2015 WL 5255012, at *3–4 (Vet. App. Sept. 10, 2015) (vacatur
and remand to the Board); Roy v. McDonald, No. 14-3481, 2015 WL 5165743, at *2–3 (Vet. App. Sept. 3,
2015) (affirmance of the Board’s decision); Langston v. McDonald, No. 14-1790, 2015 WL 5092625, at *5–6
(Vet. App. Aug. 31, 2015) (vacatur and remand to the Board).
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disparate outcomes in two different cases, decided by two different judges on the
238
same day, one of which is the aforementioned Gundersdorff.
It would be appropriate if a circuit split caused these disparate outcomes in
hearing loss cases. If that were the case, a higher court would decide the circuit
239
split without further issue, and the law would proceed normally. However, as
previously stated, the Veterans Court is the only court permitted to hear these
240
241
cases. As such, this intra-jurisdictional split is illogical. While this Comment
focuses solely on hearing loss cases, the clear example of disparate outcome in
hearing loss cases is illustrative of the same problem in other fields of Veterans
242
Law.
The Veterans Court is supposed to use the “clearly erroneous” standard for
findings of material fact and is presumably unable to substitute its own judgment
in place of the Board when there is a plausible basis in the record for the factual
243
determination of the Board. With each remand, the Veterans Court holds that
244
“there is no plausible basis in the record.” To allow this situation of disparate
outcomes to continue unchecked is to abandon the notion of precedent and
245
embrace the notion of justice by lottery.
These cases demonstrate disparate outcomes with three veterans; the same
claim, the same law, and the same attorneys led to two entirely different results
246
not justified by a variance in fact or law. The new Rule 30(a) applies to
Gundersdorff III, yet considering how similar the reasoning is to McSparrin, the

238. Withee v. Shinseki, No. 13-1537, 2014 WL 1246496, at *4–5 (Vet. App. Mar. 27, 2014) (holding
affirming Board denial of extraschedular referral of his disability claim of noncompensable hearing loss because
of adequate explanation of reasons or bases by Judge William A. Moorman); Gundersdorff v. Shinseki, No. 13123, 2014 WL 1246682, at *4–6 (Vet. App. Mar. 27, 2014) (holding remanding Board denial of referral in
regards to veteran’s noncompensable hearing loss disability claim because of inadequate explanation of reasons
or bases by Judge William S. Greenberg).
239. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a) (stating that the Supreme Court will only grant a writ of certiorari as a matter
of judicial discretion, most notably in cases where there are U.S. Court of Appeals decisions in conflict with
each other).
240. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (West 2015).
241. See discussion supra Part III.B (demonstrating the inherent unfairness of disparate outcomes at the
Veterans Court).
242. Supra Part III.A–B; see Ridgway, supra note 12 (discussing that mental health claims are a major
source of disparate outcomes at the Veterans Court).
243. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990).
244. Id.
245. Zarembo, supra note 14; see also Ridgway, supra note 12, at 41 (arguing that the underlying case
law is the likeliest cause of the disparate outcomes at the Veterans Court).
246. Supra Part III.A.1–2, 4 (discussing the inadequacy of the Court’s revision to Rule 30(a) is stopping
disparate outcomes in hearing loss cases). Note that Ms. Gundersdorff was also represented by the same law
firm as the veterans in McSparrin and Kennison. Brief of Appellant at 15, Gundersdorff v. Shinseki, No. 13123, 2014 WL 1246682 (Vet. App. Mar. 27, 2014) (stating Counsel for Appellant was Alexandra Lio of
Chisholm, Chisholm, and Kilpatrick in Providence, RI); Brief of Appellant at 10, Gundersdorff v. McDonald,
No. 14-4376, 2015 WL 7696304 (Vet. App. Nov. 30, 2015) (stating Counsel for Appellant was Michael S. Just
of Chisholm, Chisholm, and Kilpatrick in Providence, RI).
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247

persuasive value appears low. Barring an appeal to the Federal Circuit, Mr.
248
The Veterans Court remanded Ms.
McSparrin’s claim is finished.
249
Gundersdorff’s claim to the Board. The Veterans Court also remanded Mr.
250
Kennison’s claim to the Board, which again denied referral for extraschedular
251
consideration. As of this writing, Mr. Kennison’s claim is pending at the
252
Veterans Court, with Mr. Kennison filing his brief with the Court in August
253
2016.
C. The Veterans Court Alteration to Rule 30(a) in November 2015
The Veterans Court was aware of the problem of disparate outcomes, as
evidenced by the Court seeking public comment on an amendment to Rule 30(a)
254
during the summer of 2015. Under the revised rule, veterans can cite to Rule
255
30(a) cases only for “the persuasive value of their logic and reasoning.” This
change of procedure does not go far enough to fix the problem of disparate
outcomes because the rule change does nothing for cases decided under the old
256
rules.
Disparate outcomes still exist despite the Veterans Court’s amendment to
257
Rule 30(a), as Gundersdorff II and cases like it illustrate. Applying the revised
Rule 30(a) to McSparrin also indicates that the remedy is inadequate for solving
258
the problem of disparate outcomes. Chief Judge Hagel’s analysis addressed and

247. See discussion supra Parts III.A.1, 4 (demonstrating that the similarity of the reasoning and facts in
McSparrin and Gundersdorff resulted in two different outcomes and would not help any future veteran at the
Veterans Court).
248. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a) (West 2015); McSparrin v. McDonald, No. 14-2417, 2015 WL 4756508, at *10
(Vet. App. Aug. 12, 2015).
249. Gundersdorff II, No. 13-123 2015 WL 7696304, at *5 (Vet. App. Nov. 30, 2015).
250. Kennison v. McDonald, No. 14-3729, 2015 WL 4879201, at *5 (Vet. App. Aug. 17, 2015).
251. Board Decision at 2, 4–9, Kennison v. McDonald, No. 16-923 (Vet. App. filed Mar. 15, 2016). Note:
Kennison’s new case will be short-cited as Kennison II.
252. Court Docket, Kennison II, No. 16-923 (Vet. App. filed Mar. 15, 2016).
253. Brief for the Appellant at 8–10, Kennison II, No. 16-923 (Vet. App. filed Mar. 15, 2016) (arguing
that the Board failed to adequately give Mr. Kennison adequate reasons or bases for its decision to denial of his
hearing loss claim for extraschedular consideration).
254. See supra note 18 (discussing the Veterans Court’s alteration of Rule 30(a)).
255. See supra note 19 (discussing language change in Rule 30(a)).
256. See discussion Part III.B.1–2 (arguing that the revised Rule 30(a) would not change the result in
either case).
257. Supra Part III.A.4; compare Payne v. McDonald, No. 15-0228, 2016 WL 193496 (Vet. App. Jan. 15,
2016), with Graham v. McDonald, No. 15-0084, 2015 WL 9488190 (Vet. App. Dec. 30, 2015) (holdings that
lack precedential value, resulting in two different outcomes while focusing whether the Board’s decision
provided adequate reasons or bases to the veteran).
258. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (West 2015) (stating that either party can appeal to the Federal Circuit within
60 days of the Veterans Court entry of judgment); Kennison v. McDonald, 2015 WL 4879201, at *5 (Vet. App.
Aug. 17, 2015). It is moot to consider Kennison, as the Veterans Court remanded his claim back to the Board–
the desired outcome.
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dismissed every argument that Mr. McSparrin made; as a result, the outcome
259
would remain the same, especially under the “clearly erroneous” standard.
The similar quality of the VA’s work in McSparrin and Kennison does not
260
merit such a stark difference in outcomes. Chief Judge Hagel held that there
was a plausible basis in the record to affirm the Board’s decision and, as such, it
would be very unlikely that the outcome of McSparrin would change even with
261
the change in procedural rules. Without further reforms, disparate outcomes
262
will continue to occur at the Veterans Court, even with the revised Rule 30(a).
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR VETERANS COURT REFORM TO ADDRESS THE
PROBLEM OF DISPARATE OUTCOMES
The best way to solve the problem of disparate outcomes in hearing loss
cases is to further modify Rule 30(a) and for the Veterans Court to Issue a full
263
court decision that uses the rationale of McSparrin.
A. The Veterans Court Needs Additional Alterations to Rule 30(a)
Due to its organic statute and precedent, the Veterans Court cannot exercise
judicial review over the decisions of the Secretary of the VA pertaining to the
264
rating schedule. In this limited context, the Secretary of the VA, and thus the
Board, is given great deference in that rating and the Board has wide latitude in
265
assigning a rating for a disability case. The Veterans Court acknowledges this
fact as the starting analysis for hearing loss cases and uses a “mechanical
266
application of the rating schedule.”
The Veterans Court should further amend Rule 30(a). The amendments to
Rule 30(a) should be as follows:
U.S. VET. APP. R. 30(a)(1) A filed action can only be designated as nonprecedential if:
A) The action does not establish new rule of law, does not alter, modify,
criticize, or clarify an existing rule of law, does not apply an
established rule of law to a novel fact pattern, does not constitute the
259. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 52 (1990).
260. See discussion supra Part III.A.1–2 (explaining the similarity of the facts and law does not result in
enough difference to merit two different outcomes).
261. McSparrin v. McDonald, No. 14-2417, 2015 WL 4756508, at *6–7 (Vet. App. Aug. 12, 2015); see
also Part III.C (explaining how the Veterans Court altered Rule 30(a)).
262. Supra Part III.
263. Infra Part IV.A–B.
264. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(b) (West 2015); Wingard v. McDonald, 779 F.3d 1354, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
265. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(b); Wingard, 779 F.3d at 1356–57.
266. Lendenmann v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 345, 349 (1992).
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only recent, binding precedent on a particular point of law within the
scope of the Court’s authority, does not involve a legal issue of
continuing public interest, and the outcome of the case is not
reasonably debatable or;
B) The issue behind the filed action does not have a contradictory
holding on file with the Court.
U.S. Vet. App. R. 30(a)(2) If a filed action fails to satisfy either prong of
U.S. Vet. App. R. 30(a)(1), the action cannot be classified as nonprecedential and a three judge panel will be selected pursuant to the
normal procedures of the U.S. Court of Appeals of Veterans Claims to
adjudicate the claim.
These modifications codify the relevant Frankel factors and disallow the
267
Frankel factors when there is an intra-jurisdictional split on file. The modified
language requires the Veterans Court to check if the veteran’s claim for disability
benefits has a controversy that would result in disparate outcomes; as such, the
268
likelihood of disparate outcomes decreases significantly.
The additions to Rule 30(a) would also allow the Veterans Court to continue
using single-judge decisions for adjudicating appealed veterans’ cases as it only
requires a panel under certain conditions, which would allow the Veterans Court
269
to retain its autonomy. However, the Veterans Court needs to establish formal
procedures resulting in more precedential rulings that would reduce the risk of
270
disparate outcomes to veterans’ cases.
Additionally, scholars argue that the Veterans Court needs to start issuing
271
more precedential cases, regardless of procedural modification. However, given
the current political climate, this argument misses a fundamental point:
272
significant expansion of the Veterans Court seems very unlikely, considering

267. See discussion supra Part II.C (discussing the factors that came from Frankel v. Derwinski that
govern most single-judge decisions at the Veterans Court).
268. See discussion supra Part II.C (discussing how the Veterans Court issues precedential decisions).
269. See discussion supra Part II.C (explaining the procedural rules and historical background of the
Veterans Court while discussing the “clearly erroneous” standard).
270. See supra Part III.A.1–2 (arguing that a precedential decision would settle the controversy
concerning cases like McSparrin and Kennison).
271. Ridgway, supra note 12, at 42 (“As a proxy for the amorphous goal of achieving more clarity of the
law, reform of the [C]ourt’s use of single-judge decisions should target increasing the rate of published
decisions and then observing whether this succeeds in decreasing the variance between judges applying the
“settled” law.”).
272. See Patrick Caldwell, Senate Republicans are Blocking Obama’s Judges at a Nearly Unprecedented
Rate, MOTHER JONES, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/11/senate-republicans-block-obama-judgenominations (last accessed Dec. 31, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(“Republicans have been gumming up the works at each step of the process. Judicial nominations are generally
put forward by the president only once they’ve been approved by both of the home-state senators. Republicans
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the Court is not at full capacity. Even the Court acknowledges the need for
additional judges and financial resources due to an expected surge in claims in
the coming years as two Veterans Court judges face retirement by the end of
274
2016.
Therefore, simply adding more panel decisions without a plan will slow the
pace of Veterans Court review even further, frustrating the purpose of reform; as
of 2015, the Veterans Court issued 26 panel decisions stemming from 95
275
requests, and five full Court decisions stemming from fifteen requests. This
amount of cases pales when compared to the 1,313 single-judge cases the Court
276
also decided that year, considering that in 2015, on average, the Court took 383
277
days to decide a single-judge case. That year, panel decisions at the Veterans
Court added an additional 109 days on average, with a median procedural wait of
523 days for each case, a figure that does not include the minimum of 45 days
278
required if the case is set for oral argument. That outcome is untenable;
accordingly, procedural reform must accompany any additional precedent that
279
the Veterans Court issues.
B. The Veterans Court Needs to Issue a Full Court Decision on Extraschedular
Consideration Adopting Rationale that is Similar to McSparrin v. McDonald
For hearing loss cases at the Veterans Court, as demonstrated by McSparrin,
Kennison, Gundersdorff, and the case study, there are disparate outcomes at the
have been slow to give their consent to any nominee, with 55 [total] judicial vacancies currently lacking a
nomination.”).
273. Jeff Gerber, Larger Court Would Decrease Delays, BROKENVA.COM, http://www.brokenva.
com/2015/10/17/larger-court-would-decrease-delays/ (last accessed Dec. 31, 2015) (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review) (“Recently Judge William A. Moorman of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims assumed “Senior Status”—a form of semi-retirement. With Judge Moorman’s departure from the Court,
the number of active judges has been reduced to eight.”).
274. 2015 Veterans Court Report, supra note 207, at 5 (“Of note, at the same time that the number of
appeals filed at the Court is increasing, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals has projected an alarming increase in its
[Fiscal Year] 2017 workload. Additionally, the Court is quickly losing judges. The number of judges has
currently fallen to eight and without congressional action[;] it will fall to six in December 2016.”).
275. Compare 2015 Veterans Court Report, supra note 207, with 2014 Veterans Court Report, supra note
207 (stating in 2014, the Veterans Court issued 34 panel decisions stemming from 101 requests and one full
Court decision stemming from seven requests, emphasizing the rarity of precedent at the Court).
276. Compare 2015 Veterans Court Report, supra note 207, with 2014 Veterans Court Report, supra note
207 (stating in 2014, the Veterans Court decided 1,615 single-judge disability claim cases, emphasizing the
ratio of cases discussed in 2015 is not a statistical outlier).
277. Compare 2015 Veterans Court Report, supra note 207, at 3, with 2014 Veterans Court Report, supra
note 207, at 3 (stating in 2014, the Veterans Court took an average of 420 days to decide a single-judge case,
emphasizing the time taken to decide cases in 2015 is not a statistical outlier).
278. Compare 2015 Veterans Court Report, supra note 207, at 3, with 2014 Veterans Court Report, supra
note 207, at 3 (stating in 2014, the Veterans Court added an additional 142 days once a panel is assigned, with a
median procedural wait of 704 days, not including the minimum 45 days required if the parties ask for oral
arguments).
279. Supra Part IV.A.
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Veterans Court. The quickest and most efficient way to resolve this problem is
for the Veterans Court to issue a full court decision pursuant to its own Rules of
Practice and Procedure that adopts reasoning similar to McSparrin v.
281
McDonald.
Pursuant to procedural rules, the Veterans Court disfavors full court
282
opinions. As shown in this Comment, there is a persuasive argument that in
order to secure the uniformity of the Court’s decisions, the Veterans Court needs
283
to issue a full Court decision.
The Veterans Court has had the opportunity since 2009 to refine case
284
precedents as to hearing loss disability claims. In fact, the Veterans Court
declined to convene a panel on this very issue shortly after issuing Anderson in
285
Sangi v. Shinseki. Judge Kasold, in his dissent from the Court’s decision to not
convene a panel, stated that Mr. Sangi’s hearing loss disability, while
noncompensable, renders him “unable to hear smoke alarms go off and he has
286
trouble hearing conversations.” Judge Kasold also argued that the Frankel
factors may not be applicable and “at a minimum, the Board should weigh the
evidence in the first instance and make the determination [for referral for
287
extraschedular consideration], not the Court.” While a single-judge holding has
no precedential weight, and a dissent from the decision not convening a panel has
even less persuasive value, this opinion indicates that the Court was aware of this
288
controversy regarding noncompensable hearing loss cases back in 2009.
There is an argument that one should merely focus on fixing disparate
289
outcomes without deciding which set of cases is correct. Ultimately, this
290
argument is shortsighted, because it provides litigants no guidance. The Court
280. Supra Part III.A.
281. U.S. VET. APP. R. 35; see also McSparrin v. McDonald, No. 14-2417, 2015 WL 4756508, at *4–7
(Vet. App. Aug. 12, 2015) (affirming the Board’s decision while explaining the rationale for respecting the
“clearly erroneous” standard).
282. U.S. VET. APP. R. 35(c).
283. See discussion supra Part III.A (demonstrating that there are disparate outcomes at the Veterans
Court); U.S. VET. APP. R. 35(c) (stating that before convening the entire to court to decide a case, the Veterans
Court looks to determine whether there is a need for uniformity in cases).
284. See supra text accompanying notes 95–101 (stating that the veteran has the option to file a motion
for both reconsideration and precedential panel review if he disagrees with the single-judge decision); Anderson
v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 423, 427 (2009) (holding that established the last refinement of the three-element test
required by Thun v. Peake).
285. Sangi v. Shinseki, No. 06-2721, 2009 WL 3063039, at *1 (Vet. App. Sept. 24, 2009).
286. Id. at *2.
287. Id. (emphasis added).
288. Id.
289. Ridgway, supra note 12, at 21 (“This study attempts to avoid the most treacherous pitfalls of
empirical analysis by eschewing the questions of which decisions are “correct” and whether ideology plays a
role in outcomes.”).
290. See discussion supra Part III.B.1–2 (arguing that data collected about the Veterans Court and hearing
loss disability claims are just information without a purpose of their own without context explaining why they
are important).
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should definitively decide the issue; the rationale in McSparrin uses all of the
precedent case law while respecting the “clearly erroneous” standard, and its
reasoning would serve as an excellent foundation for future decisions to settle the
291
controversy.
However, if the Veterans Court instead desires an outcome that requires the
VA to issue new standards on extraschedular referral for hearing loss cases, that
292
is also an acceptable outcome as it would settle the controversy. Accordingly,
the reasoning in Kennison would likely serve well as a legal foundation for this
293
outcome. However, in the interests of justice, if the Court follows the line of
reasoning in Kennison to settle the controversy, the Court needs to revisit every
294
affirmed result since Anderson in 2009.
V. CONCLUSION
Disparate outcomes exist in hearing loss disability claims in the Veterans
Court because of the procedural rules regarding single-judge decisions and the
295
seeming lack of adherence to the “clearly erroneous” standard. For a subset of
296
cases at the Veterans Court, justice has become a lottery. In order to fix this
interminable and unacceptable problem, the Veterans Court needs to further alter
its procedural rules, as well as issue a full court decision that uses the rationale of
cases like McSparrin to end the churn of cases back and forth between the Board
297
and the Court. Allowing justice to be subject to a lottery does a disservice to all
298
parties involved.

291. See discussion supra Parts II.B.2–3, II.D, III.A.1 (demonstrating that a case like McSparrin adheres
closest to current case law while respecting the “clearly erroneous” standard).
292. See discussion supra Parts II.B.2–3, II.D, III.A.2 (demonstrating that a case like Kennison
demonstrates the paradigm for reforming allowing all veterans to receive reconsideration from the Board).
293. See discussion supra Part III.A.2 (demonstrating that a case like Kennison has rationale appropriate
to govern new substantive VA conduct).
294. See supra text accompanying notes 213, 276–78 (explaining the length of time that the Veterans
Court takes to decide cases).
295. See discussion supra Parts II.B.2–3, II.D, III.A, III.B (demonstrating disparate outcomes at the
Veterans Court under existing case law and existing procedure).
296. Supra Part III; see Ridgway, supra note 12 (arguing that there is statistical evidence for disparate
outcomes at the Veterans Court).
297. See discussion supra Part IV (arguing methods of reform to fix the problem of disparate outcomes at
the Veterans Court).
298. See discussion supra Part III (discussing the inherent unfairness resulting from disparate outcomes in
cases with the same facts and law).
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